TWO APPROACHES TO HUMAN RELATIONS

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Within the last generation there has been evidence of a change in various fields of human relations from a relatively authoritarian approach to a more egalitarian one. This change has reflected a general cultural change in attitudes toward the individual. Family relationships have become more democratic, as has education, and to some extent industry also.

Nevertheless, this change has not been complete in any area, even in the field of psychotherapy. Methods of dealing with people, of human relations, appear to be divisible into two major types which are in conflict with each other. This division and conflict seem to exist in each field of human relations. Gordon (1955, chap. 2) analyzes the two approaches in terms of two conflicting views of the nature of man. One reflects a positive, optimistic, encouraging view, while the other is based on a negative, pessimistic, discouraging view.

UNDERSTANDING

The first point of view is associated with respect for the individual and his autonomy. His right to freedom of choice, for self-determination of his behavior, for living his own life is recognized. On the other hand, the second point of view sees the individual as one who cannot take responsibility for himself, who cannot be trusted to make his own decisions. Rather he needs to be controlled from the outside. He cannot be given freedom to make his own decisions to live his life as he sees fit.

To be sure, these are descriptions of extremes, and there is a broad area in between. Nevertheless, the extremes must be recognized; they do exist in some instances, and they are the end results of two opposed attitudes toward human beings. Politically, the two approaches are represented by the democratic and authoritarian or totalitarian philosophies of government. But the conflict extends throughout all areas of human relations.

The first approach to human relations appears to be based on an understanding of the individual as a distinct, unique, self-autonomous human person or self. There is an attempt to understand the feelings, needs, desires, motives, attitudes, etc., of the individual, and to respect them rather than to attempt to influence or to control them. We shall therefore designate this as the understanding approach to human relations.

MANIPULATION

The second approach to human behavior appears to be characterized by attempts to influence or control it. This control may be direct or indirect. There is relatively little respect for the individual, although there may be claims that the influence or control is for the presumed good of the individual being influenced or controlled. Whether this claim is sincere or not is immaterial; it is the fact of external control or influence which is the essence of this approach. There may be attempts to understand the individual's feelings, needs, and attitudes; but this is done for the purpose of influencing or changing them. Because of this aspect of manipulation, we shall designate this as the manipulative approach to human relations.

This latter point of view, while it may in some respects be designated as authoritarian, is not therefore to be considered as necessarily inimical to the American tradition and philosophy. In fact, it is actually an expression of the American philosophy of efficiency. It represents an expression of the desire to get results in the shortest time, in the easiest and most direct way. In psychotherapy it represents a dissatisfaction with the length and complex involvements of orthodox psychoanalysis. It is perhaps an expression of American optimism about being able to achieve results ever more quickly and efficiently (Adelson, 1956). Weinberg (1952, p. 325) suggests that brief psychotherapy, in the manner of Alexander and French (1946), with its manipulation of the process and the client by the therapist, is a manifestation of the influence of American society upon the social and psychological sciences. Ruesch writes: "Things have to be done fast in America, and therefore therapy has to be brief" (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951, p. 148).

In addition to the American desire for efficiency and speed of results, there is another factor which supports the manipulative approach to human behavior. This is the influence of the scientific point of view. The objectives of science are commonly listed as understanding, prediction, and control. The physical sciences have set an example of the extent to which control of the physical environment is possible. The social sciences, in emulation, appear to be seeking to control human behavior to the same extent. When we go from understanding and prediction to control, we face certain problems. This is true in the physical sciences, where the uses to which such discoveries as atomic energy is put, raise questions which involve values and ethics. These questions include those of control by whom, for whom, and for what purposes. In the social and psychological fields there is the additional question of who controls whom. By what right does one individual control others? We shall consider this problem later.

IN GOVERNMENT

In the field of government, the implications of the need of the individual to have a sense of personal value are being recognized. Mayo (1933, chap. 7) called attention to this need in connection with his work in industry, suggesting that the sense of personal futility is not limited to the work situation. That the understanding of and respect for the individual is basic to democratic government would not be questioned. There is impressive evidence of the concern of government for the individual and his rights, from the development and expansion of social security programs, not as relief but as human rights provided as social insurance, to the recent recognition of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court in the field of educational integration.

Nevertheless, it is also true that government, even democratic government, in its administration tends to become bureaucratic, and to disregard the individual as a person. Gellhorn points out areas in which such a tendency seems to have been developing in recent years. He says that, "to a degree not remotely approached in the past, American citizens are the objects of suspicion of administrators rather than the object of their services" (1956, p. 38).

Leighton, in a study of the administration of a Japanese relocation camp during World War II, states some principles and recommendations for the governing of men. He concludes that "the problem which faces the administration of a community under stress is the problem of introducing remedial change . . . this does not mean that great change is always necessary, but only that great understanding is . . . not infrequently the natural reactions of self-healing in the community are adequate" (1944, pp. 355-356).

In government, therefore, we see both of these trends. There are those who desire to manipulate the governed, either for their own purposes, or because of lack of trust in the governed to be responsible for themselves. "Society needs," says Gordon, "to evolve a kind of leadership that puts human values first, a leadership that facilitates man's realization of his creative capacities, man's free expression of his individuality, man's actualization of his own uniqueness" (1955, p. 3), free from the oppressive control of external authority.

IN INDUSTRY

In industry, perhaps the beginning of the recognition of the importance of understanding was in the Hawthorne experiment at Western Electric (Mayo, 1933; Roethslisberger & Dickson, 1939,), conducted between 1927 and 1932. In this study, five operators, engaged in relay assembly, were set off by themselves, and subjected to varying external conditions of work, including the introduction and then the elimination of rest pauses and midmorning food, changes in working hours, etc. It was found that regardless of changing conditions, including reversion to less favorable conditions, production increased continuously over the entire period. The women expressed an increased satisfaction in work, and there was a decrease in absences. They attributed their better production to a greater freedom in the work situation, with opportunity to vary the pace at will, and to less strict supervision. However, supervision and company policy had been good prior to the experiment and no simple "error" of supervision could be uncovered. Interviews with about 20,000 other workers did not reveal any reliable or flagrant instances of poor supervision. There did emerge, however, some evidence of an experience of personal futility, related to feelings of constraint and interference in their work. While a background of out-of-work personal problems seemed to be involved in this feeling, there also appeared to be a lack of understanding of the work situation, involving poor communication between the working group, the supervisor, and company policies, resulting in conflicts of loyalties

There was clearly a need for improved understanding of the workers' situation. This understanding was the effective factor in the experimental situation, and in the conduct of the interviews with other employees. Both the experimental situation and the interviews indicated interest in the individual, respect for the worker as an individual and for his opinions. A report

made during the study is quoted by Mayo as follows: Much can be gained industrially by carrying greater personal consideration to the lowest levels of employment" (Mayo, 1933, p. 69).

The increase in wages-real as well as absolute; shorter working hours; holidays; vacations with pay; and fringe benefits, which now can be numbered by the dozen, have not satisfied the worker in an industrial society. Studies of what the worker desires in a job indicate that these material rewards are not at the top of the list. There are variations in different studies and, where the economic returns are low, the material aspects rank high. Surveys indicate, however, that workers are interested in intangible or psychological satisfactions in their work-security, freedom, responsibility, independence and responsibility in doing one's work, good supervisory relationships, knowledge of one's status, interesting work, recognition and approval for achievements, fair treatment, and opportunity for self-expression (Thomas, 1956, chap. 9). These represent a need and a desire to be recognized and treated as human individuals, a need to be accepted, understood, and informed. Morale in industry is largely a matter of such factors, rather than of wages and hours.

These human elements in the work situation are being recognized in industrial and personnel psychology, and by employers. A recent book in this field is concerned with "overcoming communication barriers, preventing misunderstandings, and developing the constructive side of man's nature" (Maier, 1952, p. vii). Industry's interest in employee morale and satisfaction is not, of course, entirely altruistic, since it has been clearly demonstrated that the psychological state and attitudes of employees affect production, absenteeism, and labor turnover. There is also a genuine interest of progressive management, and of unions, in the welfare and satisfaction of the employee. It might be held that unless there is genuine interest, a basic attitude of consideration and respect for the individual worker, satisfactory results will not be achieved, since employees will recognize the discrepancy between attitudes and actions. Good supervision requires attitudes of respect, understanding, and consideration for the individual worker. A study by Ghiselli (1956) concludes that "The most outstanding self-perception of the 'poor' supervisor is his sales approach to human relations," while "the good supervisor . . . sees himself as respecting the rights and dignity of others." Bass (1956) found that those who believed in consideration for subordinates were later rated as successful supervisors, while there was no relation between later rated success and opinions favoring initiation of structure.

While in the area of supervision the understanding point of view has been increasingly accepted, in other areas of industry and industrial management the manipulative approach is more in evidence. In selection and placement, in grooming executives for promotion and advancement, management seeks to control and mold the lives of its employees, even extending its influence into their social and family lives. The nature and extent of this attempted influence is portrayed in a recent book by Whyte (1956).

Shartle's study of leadership in administration (1956) clearly illustrates the simultaneous operation of these two approaches to dealing with subordinates. A factor analysis of nine dimensions of leadership resulted in two major factors, which Shartle labels "initiating structure" and "consideration." They seem to reflect the manipulative and the understanding approaches, respectively. He identifies these two dimensions of leadership with the "get the work out" approach and the "human relations" approach. He points out their similarity to dimensions

appearing in the classroom and in parent-child relationships (pp. 120-121). While the two dimensions may be viewed as complementary, with administrators using both in an integrated fashion, they are often in conflict.

Shartle writes that "Anyone who has been in a position of high leadership potential has experienced a conflict between the two dimensions. An executive knows that his superior and other persons of high influence expect them to produce. But he may regard his staff highly and may be reluctant to put the pressure on them. This conflict may become so intense that he may even seek another position" (p. 125). Shartle also recognizes that this conflict exists in our society: "There seems to be a basic conflict in our ideology of leaders. We want persons in leadership roles, and yet we do not want to place limitations upon ourselves to submit to leadership" (p. 119). Shartle aligns himself with the consideration dimension, stating that it is his "point of view that manipulation runs counter to the ideals of a democratic society" (p. 111).

IN ADVERTISING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

The greatest source of manipulation in our contemporary society is in the field of advertising and public relations. In recent years, changes have begun which raise some serious questions about the uses to which the understanding of people is being put. In the past, research and practice in marketing and public opinion has tended to be concerned with discovering the attitudes and opinions of the public as bases for advertising and sales campaigns. True, there has always been some attempt to create or change attitudes, desires, and wants. Recently this aspect of influencing consumers has been receiving increased emphasis. The fact that people are often moved to action more on the basis of emotion than reason has been known, and exploited, for a long time. The fact that these emotions operate without the awareness of the individual, and that they can be influenced without such awareness, has become the basis for much of the current attempt to influence consumers and public opinion.

Advertising has often been justified as a service to the consumer, in educating him to the availability, qualities, and usefulness of commodities for the satisfaction of his needs and wants. Appeals have been considered to be based upon the relative qualities of competing products, or the relative desirability of satisfying competing wants. The newer trend, however, doesn't appeal to the rational bases of decisions or choices, but to the irrational impulses which have no relationship to the qualities or utility of the product being advertised. Psychology is thus used not to understand people and their needs, in order to satisfy those needs, but to apply this understanding to control the behavior of people without their conscious or rational consent. In other words, knowledge of the motivations and desires of human beings is used to manipulate them in conformity with the will and desires of the manipulators. This movement has been designated as motivation research, or MR. A recent popular survey of this field is given by Packard (1957). He details the "large scale efforts . . . being made, often with impressive success, to channel our nonthinking habits, our purchasing decisions, and our thought processes by the use of insights gleaned from psychiatry and the social sciences" (p. 3). He points out that "nothing is immune or sacred" (p. 5); the baser motives, anxieties, and weaknesses of people are played upon. So-called "social engineers" are using psychological knowledge and understanding to manipulate people into conforming to what the "engineers" consider desirable-ignoring the real needs of the individual-and calling the process "human engineering."

There is probably no doubt that the effectiveness of the techniques used is overrated, and that motivational research has been oversold. There is little, if any, research evidence of the validity of the claims of successful appeal to motivations. Much of the effort and activity is based on subjective or intuitive interpretations of results of so-called depth interviews or projective testing of small samples. And admittedly there are various reasons, some of them rational, for human behavior such as buying a particular product. But the methods used appear to be effective, even though the reasons may be wrong. Without research, advertising can easily and successfully appeal to emotional elements outside the consumer's awareness.

The most recent development in this field is the use of subliminal stimuli in movie and TV advertising. While there is again no experimental evidence of its effectiveness, there is sufficient research in the psychology of perception to indicate its potential effectiveness (McConnell, Cutler, & McNeil, 1958).

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

The ethical and moral implications of such manipulation must therefore be considered (26). The potentiality of the methods in public relations and politics, suggested by Packard, are great, and of considerable significance. Packard quotes Kenneth Boulding as saying that "a world of unseen dictatorship is conceivable, still using the forms of democratic government" (1957, p. 181).

Some of those engaged in the activity have some qualms about it. Packard quotes one as saying that "It may be said that to take advantage of a man's credulity, to exploit his misapprehensions, to capitalize on his ignorance, is morally reprehensible-and this may well be the case I do not know" (pp. 258-259). Packard raises some of the ethical questions, such as "When you are manipulating, when do you stop? Who is to fix the point at which manipulation becomes socially undesirable?" (p. 240). He suggests the need for a code of ethics in advertising and public relations to control manipulative efforts.

Some have sought to defend manipulation on the grounds that it is justified by the results. In the advertising field, the reasoning seems to be that increased consumption leads to increased production, with full employment and further increased consumption, resulting in prosperity, rising standards of living, and thus general happiness. But the results are not necessarily greater happiness psychologically, nor in some cases even materially. Particularly in the political field might this not be the case (Sargent, 1957). Moreover, one might question whether the ends justify the means. The means involve the manipulation of human personality, and this manifests a disrespect for the individual, his rights, and his worth. Packard writes that "the most serious offense many of the depth manipulators commit, it seems to me is that they try to invade the privacy of our minds. It is this right to the privacy of our minds-privacy to be either rational or irrational-that I believe we must strive to protect" (p. 266). It would seem to be appropriate for those psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists, who have given their support and services to these manipulators, to consider the consequences of their abetting the trend toward manipulation, and to examine their consciences regarding the desirability and morality of such activity. The frightful situation of thought control so vividly described by Orwell (1949) doesn't appear to be too fantastic in the light of the activities and goals of these

manipulators of our attitudes and behavior in the fields of advertising, public relations, and particularly political campaigning.

MANIFESTATIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY

Rogers (1948) feels that the major trend in clinical psychology and psychiatry has been toward the manipulative point of view. Suggesting that it leads to a philosophy of social control by the few, he feels, however, that few psychologists or psychiatrists would agree with this end, though he quotes Skinner as one psychologist who does advocate a frank facing of the possibility and desirability of controlling human behavior. Skinner apparently believes that such control by psychologists is better than leaving it to "those who grasp it for selfish purposes: to advertisers, propagandists, demagogues, and the like" (1947, p. 25). Rogers points up the implications of control even by psychologists or experts, in terms of the loss of independence by the individual.

Currently in the field of counseling and psychotherapy, the trend toward manipulation does not appear to the writer to be as strong as the trend toward the understanding approach. Gordon (1955), however, seems to feel that at the present time the balance is still toward the manipulative approach. Bateson describes the changing conception of psychotherapy as follows:

> "The change toward larger Gestalten and the necessity of this change for both humanistic and formal reasons can be illustrated by considering Sullivan's emphasis upon the phenomenon of interaction. This emphasis is very clearly part of a defense of man against the older, more mechanistic thinking which saw him so heavily determined by his internal psychological structure that he could easily be manipulated by pressing the appropriate buttons-a doctrine which made the therapeutic interview into a one-way process, with the patient in a relatively passive role. The Sullivanian doctrine places the therapeutic interview on a human level, defining it as a significant meeting between two human beings. The role of the therapist is no longer to be dehumanized in terms of definable purpose which he can plan, and the role of the patient is no longer dehumanized into that of an object of manipulation" (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951, p. 263).

Bateson feels that "by and large, psychiatrists have a permissive understanding" (p. 127). Sutich wrote in 1944 (Sutich, 1944): "It is evident that modern therapeutic and analytical principles have their roots in democratic principles throughout the entire range of human behavior." A recent volume on psychotherapy to which a number of outstanding contemporary psychotherapists contributed (Fromm-Reichmann & Moreno, 1956) seems to reflect a growing acceptance of the understanding approach; this appears to be the major theme of the contributions to the book.

Nevertheless, the manipulative approach is still much in evidence in counseling and psychotherapy. It is manifested by a lack of trust or confidence in the client to solve his own problems, to take responsibility for himself in the therapeutic process. It is characterized by activity on the part of the therapist, who takes responsibility for the treatment process, diagnosing and analyzing the client's problems and advancing solutions. There may be direct attempts to mold the client's attitudes, values, and behavior. There is an apparent assumption that the client is incapable of understanding himself and the complex psychological dynamics of his

behavior. Rather, he needs an expert to explain, interpret, advise, teach, direct, persuade, even to exhort, inspire and preach. The client is helpless, and dependent on the therapist, who is strong and wise and who knows best what is good for him

In a recent series of addresses dedicating a new hospital in St. Louis, Saslow (Saslow, 1956) detected as one of the major themes the question of control of behavior, although only one speaker (Cobb) explicitly mentioned it. Saslow raises a question about the values of those who control behavior even in a therapeutic community setting, or of any professional persons who have within their power some means of modification and control of the behavior of persons they wish to influence. In the case of the use of tranquilizing drugs, for example, he asks: "Who will tranquilize whom? Under what circumstances? And for what purposes?" (p. 106).

It thus appears that we must question the use of methods of manipulation even in the hands of professional persons who presumably would use them for the good of those whom they manipulate. There is a question regarding the goals of such manipulation, even in the hands of professional persons. Essentially, it is this: is it desirable, or ethical, to manipulate anyone, for any purpose, or is this inimical to self-responsibility and self-determination, which appear to be increasingly recognized and accepted as desirable goals or values in our society?

Freud appears to have had a basic concept of the individual which would lead to a manipulative or controlling type of therapy (Bruner, 1956; Gordon, 1955; Rogers & Skinner, 1956; Walker, 1956). Freud viewed man as basically bad, accepting essentially the doctrine of original sin, as Mayo l933, p. 158) points out. Life was viewed as a strenuous fight to control or to subdue perversion or pathological impulses. The individual was in constant conflict with society, and Freud identified himself with society. The therapist then would tend to be a controlling element. Nevertheless, though Freud was apparently rather authoritative in therapy, many other analysts in practice have not been particularly manipulative.

Attempts to shorten the traditional lengthy analysis have resulted in more activity and manipulation on the part of the therapist, as exemplified by Alexander and French (1946). A few other therapists have advocated active manipulation, e.g., Salter (1949) and Herzberg (1945). De Grazia (1952) also would appear to sanction considerable manipulation on the part of the therapist, and the sector or limited therapy of Deutsch and Murphy (1955) is relatively therapist controlled.

In the understanding approach in psychotherapy, emphasis is placed upon the capacity of the client for taking responsibility for himself, beginning with the therapeutic process itself. There is confidence that the client will make the best, or "right," choices for himself, without coercion, direction, or pressure of any kind. He can be trusted to make his own decisions. Dependence is placed upon the natural or inherent growth forces in the individual. The therapeutic situation is one in which an atmosphere is created in which these growth forces can be released and allowed to operate. Maslow expresses it well as follows: "The key concepts in the newer dynamic psychology are spontaneity, release, naturalness, self-acceptance, impulse awareness, gratification. They used to be control, inhibition, discipline, training, shaping, on the principle that the depths of human nature were dangerous, evil, predatory, and ravenous" (24, p. 352).

One might question whether the understanding approach is not basically manipulative. The object of any therapy is to change behavior, and thus to control it. But there is a difference in the meaning of control here. In the understanding relationship the nature and the extent of the change is under the complete control of the client. The therapist provides only the atmosphere, or the conditions, under which the client can change if he chooses to do so. In the understanding approach, the objective is to facilitate self-determined change.

Institutional care of the mentally ill has been characterized by the manipulative attitude. Custodial care has had as its objective the control of patients; drugs, physiotherapy, hydrotherapy, and shock, as well as conventional restraints, have been used as methods of control. Recently, however, there has been progress toward the understanding approach (Bass, 1956; Greeenblatt, York & Brown; Jones, 1944; Stanton & Schwartz, 1954). Gilbert and Levinson (1956) use the term "humanistic" to apply to the newly developing viewpoint. In this conception, the hospital is "a community of citizens rather than a rigidly codified institutional mold," and "the hospital members (are) persons rather than mere objects and agents of treatment." The hospital is conceived of as a therapeutic community, or a therapeutic social environment, existing for the patients rather than, as in many custodial institutions, for the staff. Gilbert and Levinson see the custodial orientation as autocratic with a rigid status hierarchy and a minimizing of communication. The humanistic orientation, on the other hand, attempts to democratize the hospital, increasing patient self-determination and opening channels of communication.

The fears of those who felt that giving patients freedom, treating them as persons rather than as objects, would result in a return of bedlam have not been realized. Instead, when patients have been given freedom and self-government or a voice in institutional management, they have shown themselves capable of accepting responsibilities. Rather than becoming agitated and violent, they have become less troublesome, less regressive. Stanton and Schwartz (1954) report that incontinence and soiling practically disappeared from the hospital. The results of the humanistic or understanding approach, where it has been tried, have been little less than spectacular and probably no less effective than the tranquilizing drugs.

EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF UNDERSTANDING

While questions regarding the effectiveness of the understanding approach might be raised, there is evidence of its value where it has been used. The effectiveness of the manipulative approach seems to be clear-in certain situations and for certain purposes. It is effective in influencing behavior in directions desired by the manipulator, such as in advertising. We can, of course, raise questions regarding the desirability of such manipulation, both as regards its purposes and its means.

The understanding approach may be questioned as a technique for controlling or influencing people toward behavior desired by someone else. This, however, is not the purpose of the approach. As indicated above in the discussion of psychotherapy, its purpose is to make possible self-desired change in the individual. Actually, such changes, as in psychotherapy, are usually in directions desired by society as a whole.

One might question whether this approach is economical or efficient in initiating change in behavior; one is reminded of the old problem of the efficiency of democracy relative to an authoritarian government. Which is desirable depends on one's goals and values. Democracy is slow and inefficient in situations where immediate, specific action is required. So may be the understanding approach. It is difficult to think of an army being led in battle on this basis, for example. Yet, even in the military situation, this approach may be the most effective in building up an organization with high morale prior to action. To achieve its purpose, which is self-responsible behavior, no other method appears to be as effective.

We have already referred to some situations in which this approach has been effective in developing satisfaction and adjustment in the individual as well as socially-desired behavior. The Western Electric study (Mayo, 1933; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) indicates its effectiveness in industry. Maier (1952, pp. 7-10) refers to a number of studies which indicate that when groups participate in decision-making, with the point of view of each individual being recognized, understood, and considered, acceptance and satisfaction with the results is greater than where the decision is made outside the group. James Richards reports the effective use of group-centered leadership in an industrial situation in Gordon (1955, chap. 12).

Morse and Reimer (1956) report the results of two programs of decision-making in industry, one autonomous, the other hierarchically controlled. Worker satisfaction increased under the first, and decreased under the second. Productivity increased under both, though more under the second than under the first. Lewin (1947) reports a study in which it was found that group discussion and decision resulted in greater changes in food habits than did a lecture. The experiments of Lewin and his students (Lewin, Lippitt & White, 1939; Lippitt, 1940; Lippitt & White, 1947) on democratic and autocratic atmospheres indicate that groups function more constructively in a democratic situation. Similar results were found in a study of teachers' classroom behavior (Anderson & Brewer, 1945); and in the area of parent-child relationships a democratic family environment was found to be related to child adjustment (Baldwin, Kalhorn & Breese, 1945). In the field of medicine and public health there is evidence for the effectiveness of this approach in helping the individual seek and accept treatment. The Peckham Experiment in London found that while direct medical advice is not usually followed, when the facts and their implications were simply presented without advice, action was taken in the overwhelming majority of cases (Pearse & Williams, 1938; discussed in Rogers [1951, pp. 59-60] and in Gordon [1955, p. 35]). In psychotherapy there are no adequate data regarding the relative effectiveness of various approaches. But it appears that the understanding approach, as represented by client-centered therapy, is at least as effective as any other approach. The general opinion of therapists seems to be that an understanding approach leading to self-initiated change yields greater and more permanent changes in personality and behavior than does the manipulative approach.

Rogers (1951), speaking of the understanding relationship, says "if the administrator, or military or industrial leader, creates such a climate within his organization, then his staff will become more self-responsible, more creative, better able to adapt to new problems, more basically cooperative. It appears possible to me that we are seeing the emergence of a new field of human relationships, in which we may specify that if certain attitudinal conditions exit, then certain definable changes will occur."

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL

Skinner (1953), an experimental psychologist, raises some serious questions which deserve attention. Pointing out that control is the result of science, he states that "we have no guarantee that the power thus generated will be used for what appear to be the best interests of mankind.... A science doesn't contain within itself any means of controlling the use to which its contributions will be put.... Are we to continue to develop a science of behavior without regard to the use which will be made of it? If not, to whom is the control which it generates to be delegated? . . . There is good reason to fear those who are most apt to seize control" (pp. 437-438). He points out that to proclaim that man is a free agent is impossible -- "we all control, and we are all controlled" (p. 438). Moreover, "to refuse to accept control . . . is merely to leave control in other hands" (p. 439). In psychotherapy, for example, the individual may be able to reach his own solution in a "good" society, but what if he is subject to all kinds of controls outside of therapy? The advantage of democracy over totalitarianism is that control is diversified in the former." It is the inefficiency of diversified agencies which offers some guarantee against despotic use of power" (p. 440). Different sources of control cancel each other out, as it were. While the government may be assigned superior power, the problem of preventing its misuse remains. Skinner hopes, however, that "science may lead us to the design of a government, in the broadest possible sense, which will necessarily promote the well-being of those who are governed" (p. 443). He suggests freedom, security, happiness, and knowledge as conditions of a strong society. These conditions, he recognizes, involve moral or ethical issues. Yet, he continues, "If a science of behavior can discover those conditions of life which make for the ultimate strength of men, it may provide a set of 'moral values' which, because they are independent of the history and culture of any one group, may be generally accepted" (p. 445). By the "strength of men" he appears to mean survival of the group or culture, but since the conditions for this survival cannot be predicted, we cannot discover the values that make for the "ultimate strength of men." Nor does Skinner answer the question of who should control. Who should control is determined by who will in the group which survives.

Skinner, therefore, has no solution to the problem of control. He does not propose that scientists should control. But control exists. "Western thought has emphasized the importance of the individual. The use of such concepts as individual freedom, initiative, and responsibility has . . . been well reinforced" (pp. 446-447). But "The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of the scientific method to the study of human behavior. The free inner man who is held responsible for the behavior of the external biological organism is only a prescientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are discovered in the course of scientific analysis. All these alternative causes lie outside the individual" (pp. 446-448). As Ruesch and Bateson (1951, p. 216) put it, ". . . in regard to the Pavlovian subject we may now state that he will learn to expect a world in which he has no control over the good and evil which may befall him." Thus behavior theory, as well as Freudian psychology, with their mechanistic concept of determinism, leave no place for individual choice and therefore responsibility. Mowrer (1957), disturbed by this lack of responsibility, appears to be repudiating behavioral psychology.

So we have no solution to the problem of control, says Skinner. Man is not a free agent, and has no control over his own behavior, which is determined from without. Skinner has returned to the

stimulus response behaviorism of Watson. He describes three links in the chain of behavior: (1) an operation performed upon the organism from without; (2) an inner condition; and (3) a kind of behavior. The second link is not essential for the control of behavior. "The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they are not relevant in a functional analysis ...Unless there is a weak spot in our causal chain so that the second link is not lawfully determined by the first, or the third by the second, then the first and third must be lawfully related" (p. 35). Indeed, there is a weak spot in the chain; the second link is not determined solely by the first, but is influenced by other factors and conditions within the organism which affect the perception, definition, and interpretation of the stimulus, except perhaps in simple reflex acts. This factor accounts for what is referred to as the freedom of the individual, or free will. While it is true that all behavior is determined, the individual often experiences the sense of choice. This experience is a fact, which must be considered because of its influence on the individual's attitudes and behavior. Skinner states that "science is a willingness to accept facts even when they are opposed to wishes" (p. 13). But what are "facts"? What is truth, or knowledge? Behavior is not determined by objective stimuli, but by the perceptions of the world by the individual. "Man lives essentially in his own personal and subjective world . . . though there may well be such a thing as objective truth, I can never know it; all I can know is that some statements appear to me subjectively to have the qualifications of objective truth. Thus there is no such thing as scientific knowledge; there are only individual perceptions of what appears to each person to be such knowledge" (Rogers, 1956, pp. 10-11).

Bateson presents a similar statement, with the added concept that belief in one's perceptions (or values) constitutes validity:

"The definition of a relationship depends not merely upon the skeleton of events which make up the interaction but also upon the way the individuals concerned see and interpret these events. Thus seeing or interpreting can be regarded as the application of a set of propositions about the world or the self whose validity depends upon the subject's belief in them. The individuals are partially free to interpret their world according to the premises of their respective character structure, and their freedom to do this is still further increased by the phenomena of selective awareness and by the fact that the perceiving individual plays a part in creating the appropriate sequences of action by contributing his own action to the sequence" (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951, pp. 220-221).

Thus, the concepts of individual freedom, initiative, and responsibility are experienced, and are therefore facts; moreover, they are held to be values by a large part, if not the majority, of mankind. If accepted as such, then we are justified in attempting to preserve them, and in resisting the encroachment of control from the outside, whether or not it is for the presumed good of the individual.

The concept of control, as used by Skinner, covers several different things. He appears to include the determination or influencing of behavior by physical factors of the environment, by other individuals, by groups of individuals, and by agencies such as the government. Used in this sense, control is inevitable. Some control is no doubt necessary and desirable in order to prevent anarchy. For, although man may be fundamentally good, many men have been corrupted by the imperfect society in which we live; and even in a more perfect society, some men would no

doubt have some antisocial impulses. Such control as is necessary or desirable is only for the purpose of protecting the legitimate freedom of the individual from being infringed upon by the unwarranted freedom of others. The control is of the environment, to assure that it makes possible the maximum freedom and initiative of individuals. As to who should exercise this control, it would seem that we have no better alternative than to vest it in the elected representatives of a free people, whether their choices are, in essence, determined in the sense that they are not capricious.

If we accept as values or goals of life the independence, freedom, initiative, and spontaneity of the individual, then we must prevent encroachment on these by the manipulative activities of others. If these concepts be illusory, we are still justified in preserving them, as long as they are values. And it might well be that these are the moral values which are independent of history and culture, and which constitute the "strength of men" which will assure the survival of our society.

In this paper we have distinguished two major, and opposed, approaches to human relations-designated as the understanding and the manipulative approaches. Both are present, in varying degrees, in every field of human relations. Each is dominant in one or more fields, e.g., understanding in counseling and psychotherapy, manipulation in advertising and public relations. The manipulative approach creates certain problems in terms of the ethics of controlling human behavior. The apparent snow-balling of the manipulative approach in advertising and public relations, and its entrance into politics, raise some real concern about the future, with specters of the horrors of Orwell's Nineteen eighty-four. The implications should be considered seriously by all students of human behavior who are concerned about the freedom of the individual. Some control apparently is necessary, and we have indicated its place in society. We do not pretend to have dealt with the problems of control at all adequately, however. Rogers and Skinner (1956) present a stimulating discussion of this problem.

Our main concern here is with counseling and psychotherapy. Understanding, rather than control, should characterize counseling and psychotherapy; and the understanding approach seems to be well entrenched in this field, though not universally applied or carried to its logical extreme. It is consistent with, and indeed the expression of, the ethical principles and philosophy of counseling. The ultimate expression of this approach is client-centered therapy.

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